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V. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. Descendibility and Sufficiency of Exploitation During Life
1. Martin Luther King, Jr. P. American Heritage Products,
Inc.
The right of publicity has been defined as an individual's right to
exclusive control over the commercial exploitation of his or her name
and likeness.' This right is most often asserted by or on behalf of pro-
fessional athletes, actors, actresses, comedians, and other entertainers.
In Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American
Heritage Products, Inc. ,2 however, the controversy involved the right of
publicity of assassinated civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr., a
public figure who did not fall into any of these categories.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal based its decision on the
Georgia Supreme Court's response to its certified questions regarding
the right of publicity. According to the Supreme Court of Georgia, the
right of publicity for public figures such as Dr. King is a right distinct
from the right of privacy,3 and is both inheritable and devisable,
thereby surviving the death of its owner.4 Furthermore, and perhaps of
greater importance, the court held that exploitation of the right during
the life of the owner is not a prerequisite to its descendibility.5
Plaintiffs were the Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social
Change (the Center),6 Coretta Scott King, as administratrix of Dr.
King's estate, and Motown Record Corporation, the assignee of the
rights to several of Dr. King's copyrighted speeches. Defendant James
E. Bolen manufactured and sold plastic busts of Dr. King through his
company, American Heritage Products, Inc. Although the Center re-
fused Bolen's offer to have the Center participate and endorse the mar-
keting of the busts, Bolen began promoting the product on a national
scale. Bolen's advertisements, which purported to offer the bust as "an
exclusive memorial" and "an opportunity to support the Martin Luther
King, Jr., Center for Social Change," also stated that a portion of the
1. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569 (1977).
2. 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983).
3. Id at 680.
4. Id. at 681-82.
5. Id at 683. Exploitation is, according to the court, "commercial use by the celebrity
other than the activity which made him or her famous."
6. The Center is a non-profit organization seeking to promote the ideals of Dr. King.
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
purchase price would be donated to the Center.7 Testimony in the dis-
trict court revealed that money had been tendered by Bolen to the
Center, but that it was refused by its governing Board.8
Suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia to enjoin further advertisements and sales of the
busts. The district court granted an injunction against Bolen's use of
the Center's name in advertising and marketing the bust, and against
further use of King's copyrighted material. The court did not, how-
ever, enjoin the manufacture and sales of the busts. The Center
claimed that the manufacture and sale of the busts infringed upon Dr.
King's right of publicity which had descended to his heirs.9 The court
concluded that it was unnecessary to reach the descendibility question
in Georgia because Dr. King had not commercially exploited this right
during his lifetime.l° On the Center's appeal of the partial denial of the
preliminary injunction, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, adopt-
ing the opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court, reversed and
remanded.
In the absence of controlling Georgia precedents on the issues
presented, the Georgia Supreme Court first concluded that public
figures have a right of publicity similar to a private citizen's right of
privacy.11 The court noted that the interest protected in right of publi-
city cases, however, "is not so much a mental as a proprietary one, in
the exclusive use of the plaintiff's name and likeness as an aspect of his
identity."' 2 The court stated that lower Georgia courts have recognized
7. 694 F.2d at 675. The advertisements were placed by Bolen in the November and
December 1980 issues of Ebony magazine. Moreover, Bolen published a brochure which
was inserted in 80,000 copies of newspapers nationwide. The brochures repeated the state-
ments made in the advertisements in Ebony and also contained photographs of Dr. King
and portions of his copyrighted speeches. Furthermore, Bolen testified that out of the $29.95
purchase price, 3% was set aside as a contribution to the Center. Although a trust fund for
the contributed earnings was established, the trust fund agreement was never executed.
8. 694 F.2d at 675.
9. Id at 676.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 680.
12. Id at 679-80. The court cited Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114 Ga. App. 367, 151 S.E.2d 496
(1966), to illustrate Dean Prosser's four-pronged analysis of the right of privacy, published
in Privacy 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960). Prosser suggests that the invasion of privacy is, in
fact, composed of four loosely related torts under a common name; and that there are four
distinct types of invasions of four distinct interests of plaintiff. These four torts have been
described as: "(1) intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his private
affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarassing facts about plaintiff; (3) publicity which places
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; (4) misappropriation for the defendant's advantage,
of plaintiffs name or likeness." The right of publicity derives from this fourth prong.
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the rights of both private citizens 3 as well as entertainers 4 to prevent
the unauthorized use of their names and photographs for the financial
gain of the user. The court went on to conclude, "[wie know of no
reason why a public figure prominent in religion and civil rights should
be entitled to less protection than an exotic dancer or a movie
actress." 15
The Georgia Supreme Court further held that, even in the absence
of exploitation of the right during the owner's lifetime, the right of pub-
licity was descendible."6 The court stated that the right of publicity is
assignable during the life of a celebrity because "without this character-
istic, full commercial exploitation of one's name and likeness is practi-
cally impossible."' 7  Recognizing its assignability, the court was
influenced by many cases and commentators that have urged that the
right of publicity must also be descendible. " To hold otherwise would,
in effect, destroy the value of both the financial benefits accruing to the
celebrity's heirs and of any exclusive rights purchased by assignees.19
The court intimated that, profit from the use of the celebrity's name or
likeness should accrue to the benefit of the celebrity's heirs, instead of
to unauthorized users.20 The court noted that, if the right of publicity
was not descendible, the result would be to grant "a windfall in the
form of freedom to use with impunity the name or likeness of the de-
ceased celebrity who may have worked his or her entire life to attain
celebrity status."'' 2  The court also stated that recognition of the right of
13. Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1908)(holding
that the "publication of a picture of a person, without his consent, as part of an advertise-
ment, for the purposes of exploiting the publisher's business, is a violation of the right of
privacy of the person whose picture is reproduced .. ").
14. Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114 Ga. App. 367, 151 S.E.2d 496 (1966) (holding that plaintiff,
an exotic dancer, could recover from the owner of the Atlanta Playboy Club for the unau-
thorized use of the dancer's misnamed photograph in an entertainment magazine advertis-
ing the Playboy Club); McQueen v. Wilson, 117 Ga. App. 488, 161 S.E.2d 63, reversed on
other grounds, 224 Ga. 420, 162 S.E.2d 313 (1968)(the Court of Appeal holding that a film
actress could recover for the unauthorized use of her photograph).
15. 694 F.2d at 680. The court was referring to the Cabaniss and McQueen cases, supra,
at note 14.
16. Id. at 683.
17. Id at 680-81, citing Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868
(2d Cir. 1953).
18. Id at 681.
19. Id
20. Id at 682.
21. Id; the court cited Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1355 (1981),
which quoted Chief Justice Bird's'dissent in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603
P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
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publicity rewards and thereby encourages effort and creativity.22 Fur-
thermore, the court stated that the trend since the early common law
has been "to recognize survivability, notwithstanding the legal
problems which may thereby arise."23
Finally, and most importantly, the court held that exploitation is
not a prerequisite to descendibility of the right of publicity. The facts
of this case bring this point into focus because a well-known minister
like Dr. King "may avoid exploiting his prominence during life be-
cause to do otherwise would impair his ministry. 2 4 The court, in at-
tempting to avoid placing an undesirable premium on exploitation,
concluded that a person who avoids exploitation during life is entitled
to have his image protected against exploitation after death. He is enti-
tled to such protection "just as much if not more than an person who
exploited his image during life."25
The concurring opinion26 agreed only with the result reached by
the majority while disagreeing with its substantive analysis. The con-
currence stated that while the Center is entitled to relief, its remedy is
founded in the common count of money had and received,27 and not in
the right of publicity. The concurrence cautioned that by proclaiming
this new right of publicity, the majority has "created an open-ended
and ill-defined force which jeopardizes a right of unquestioned authen-
ticity-free speech."28 Further, the majority statement that the new
right of publicity is violated only in cases involving financial gain, is a
tenuous standard. The dividing line, according to the concurrence,
should not be premised on the presence or absence of proprietary gain,
but should focus instead on community standards of what is fair and of
what is unconscionable.29
The King decision is important in that it is distinguishable from
most right of publicity cases. While Dr. King was a public figure, his
primary purpose was not to make money, but rather to promote a pub-
lic service. It appears to this author that the majority seemed to be
22. Id
23. Id The court cited no authority for this proposition.
24. Id at 683.
25. Id
26. The concurring opinion was filed by Justice Weltner of the Georgia Supreme Court.
27. 694 F.2d at 685.
28. Id The concurrence posits that the commercial merchandising of the likeness of Dr.
King may be "speech" within the ambit of First Amendment inquires.
29. Id at 686. The concurrence stated that all speech is not "'free', in the sense of being
immune from all consequence." Further, the law may impose restraints upon forms of
speech where the community decides the "calculable evil of its license plainly outweighs the
potential evil of its prohibition."
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protecting Dr. King's right of privacy. The Center sought injunctive
relief to prohibit the marketing of busts "unfitting" to the image of Dr.
King, a complaint sounding more in the right of privacy than in the
right of publicity. As the concurrence suggested, the Center had other
routes by which to obtain the desired injunction.3" This expansion of
the right of publicity as a means of affording relief to plaintiffs, there-
fore, seems unnecessary.
It is not clear here that the right of publicity is entirely distinct
from the right of privacy against commercial appropriation. 31 It has
been suggested that the two rights give. rise to essentially the same cause
of action.32 In both right of publicity actions and privacy-misappropri-
ation cases, the alleged harm is one of unauthorized commercial appro-
priation by defendant of plaintiffs name and likeness. 3 However, the
two rights are distinguishable. For example, the general rule is that the
right of privacy is personal to the individual and is neither assignable
nor descendible.34 To uphold the descendibility of the right of publi-
city in cases analogous to privacy-misappropriation cases, therefore, is
to circumscribe the general rule and allow a right of privacy to descend
after the death of the individual. This is precisely what the majority
has done in King.
One cannot confidently state what the effects of the King decision
will be on entertainers in Georgia because the facts are clearly distin-
guishable from the usual context in which the right has been upheld.
The court stated that a public figure who guards against exploitation in
his lifetime, is entitled to have exploitation guarded against after death.
The court does not declare that one who does exploit his commercial
interests while alive, is guaranteed the ability to pass these publicity
rights on to his heirs. Given Dr. King's commercial reluctance and the
political posture surrounding the case, the decision should be narrowly
construed. Dr. King was the pivotal black civil rights leader in the
1960s. If his right of publicity was held to be not descendible, then, in
effect, anyone could use Dr. King's image for unlimited purposes with
impunity. This may have been a disturbing prospect for the Georgia
Supreme Court. The pending establishment of Dr. King's birthday as
a national holiday could not have escaped their consideration of this
30. Id at 685.
31. See note 12, supra.
32. See Hoffman, Limitations on the Right ofPublicity, 28 Bulletin, Copyright Society of
the U.S.A., 112, 135 (1980).
33. Id
34. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 117, 814-15 (4th ed. 1971).
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case. Given these circumstances, one would not expect the Georgia
Supreme Court to deny the Center, and to some degree the state of
Georgia, the increased economic and political value attributable to
Martin Luther King. Consequently, it is not clear that this case can be
relied on for the general proposition that an entertainer in Georgia has
descendible publicity rights, with or without exploitation of his com-
mercial rights while alive.
Alison D. Bernhard*
2. Commerce Union Bank v. Coors- Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc.
Commerce Union Bank v. Coors 7 Med. L. Rptr. 2204 (Ten-
nessee Chancery Court) (1981) - Despite a prior and
contrary Sixth Circuit ruling, the Tennessee Chancery
Court held that the right of publicity is inheritable and
survives death.
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. 541 F. Supp. 231 (1982) -
In light of the Tennessee Chancery Court ruling, the U.S.
District Court held that final entry of judgment would be
stayed so that the Second Circuit could re-evaluate
whether right of publicity was descendible.
Courts have almost universally recognized that celebrities should
be able to profit commercially from the exploitation of their likenesses
through various merchandising and marketing endeavors.' What has
not been determined is whether that right should be descendible. The
following cases offer a unique opportunity to examine how courts ad-
dress the area of right of publicity given a conflicting body of
precedent.2
In the 1940's, Lester Flatt, a popular bluegrass vocalist and guitar
player, teamed up with banjo player Earl Scruggs and developed a
distinctive sound that continued to gain popularity through the next
few decades. In fact, at the pinnacle of their career in the 1960's, the
* The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance and support of Clifford
Werber.
1. See generally Heneghan & Wamsley, The Service Mark Alternative To The Right Of
Publicity.- Estate o/Presley v. Russen, 14 Pac. L. J. 181 (1983); Note, The Right of Publicity-
Protection for Public Figures and Celebrites, 42 Brooklyn L. Rev. 527 (1976); Gordon, Right
of Privacy in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 553 (1960).
2. The term "right of publicity" was first examined in the case of Halean Laboratories,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d dir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
[Vol. 4
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
music of Flatt and Scruggs was used as the theme for the hit television
series The Beverly Hillbillies. The motion picture Bonnie and Clyde
also featured much of their music.
In the mid-50's Flatt established a commercial relationship with
Martha White Mills, Nashville-based producer of Martha White Flour.
He and Scruggs were featured on radio and later in television shows
sponsored by the company, thereby establishing a close tie with the
firm that lasted beyond the Flatt-Scruggs split-up in 1969.
In April, 1981 (nearly two years after Flatt's death)3, Coors initi-
ated an advertising campaign, distributing posters that prominently
featured an artist's depiction of Flatt and Scruggs, along with their mu-
sical group, The Foggy Mountain Boys. Coors had never obtained per-
mission to use Flatt's likeness on the posters and made no attempt to
compensate the estate for its use. In Commerce Union Bank v. Coors,4
the suit brought by Flatt's estate alleging a violation of Flatt's right of
publicity, Coors sought dismissal on the grounds that Flatt's right of
publicity did not survive his death.5
The Tennessee Chancery Court hearing the case had to consider a
contradictory body of law concerning the right of publicity. Of most
concern were two recent cases holding that a celebrity's right of public-
ity did not survive death.
The chancery court first considered Lugosi v. Universal Pictures6,
in which the California Supreme Court held that since actor Bela Lu-
gosi had not exploited his likeness commercially during his lifetime, his
right of publicity did not survive his death (was not descendible to his
heirs). Lugosi was distinguishable, as the case dealt not with Lugosi's
own persona, but with the exploitation of the Count Dracula character,
to which arguably Lugosi had no claim.
Whether California courts would find the right to be descendible
even if sufficiently exploited during one's life (as Flatt had done) re-
mains in doubt. In a decision following Lugosi, and not addressed in
Flatt, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier reasoning
finding that the nephew of the late Rudolf Valentino had no right to
damages in a claim against a television program depicting the life of
the actor. The court stated that "[tihe right of publicity is not descendi-
3. Flatt died on May 11, 1979 at the age of 64.
4. 7 Med. L. Rptr. 2204 (1981).
5. Id
6. 25 Cal.3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, (1979).
1984]
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ble and expires on the death of the person so protected."7
Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc. ,' the second
case considered by the chancery court in Commerce, has since become
the source of much confusion in the area. This Sixth Circuit decision
dealt with Factors' exclusive license to exploit Elvis Presley's name
commercially. Memphis Development Foundation had originally sued
Factors in federal district court in Tennessee in an effort to prevent
Factors from interfering with its plan to erect a large statue of Presley
in downtown Memphis. Funds for the project were to be raised by
selling small pewter replicas of the proposed statue. After the district
court held for Factors and entered a permanent injunction, its decision
was overturned on appeal by the Sixth Circuit. The appellate court
concluded that although Tennessee courts had not directly or indirectly
addressed the issue, the right of publicity was not descendible.9 This
decision has been highly criticized by those who feel that the appellate
court arrived at its holding through arbitrary reasoning.' °
Realizing that the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Memphis was irrecon-
cilable with its own reasoning, the chancery court in Commerce at-
tempted to justify its actions by stating that they were not bound by a
federal court decision. The court noted that the reasoning of the dis-
trict court seemed more persuasive than that of the appellate court.
Furthermore, the chancery court stressed a public policy approach, ar-
guing that the right of publicity "should" survive after death because of
judicial precedent, as well as "fundamental fairness considerations.""
The court, in Commerce, looked to the dissent by Justice Mans-
field in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. 12, where he stated, "It would
be rational for Tennessee courts to adopt a policy enhancing the con-
tinued growth of Nashville and Memphis as centers for the lives and
activities of music industry personalities."' 3  Mansfield felt that the
7. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 861, 603 P.2d 454, 455, 160
Cal. Rptr. 352, 353 (1979).
8. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
9. Id
10. See Balog, Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts Inc.: Deference To Circuit Court Rulings On
State Law, 15 John Marshall L. Rev. 499 (1982), examining the procedural inconsistencies
caused by the Memphis decision, and how the Second Circuit's later reliance on the Sixth
Circuit's interpretation of Tennessee state law may have been misplaced and in potential
conflict with the well-supported dictates of Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (Erie re-
quires federal courts in diversity cases to look to the substantive law of the states in which it
sits).
11. 7 Med. L. Rptr. at 2208.
12. 652 F.2d 278, 288 (2d Cir. 1981).
13. Id.
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Memphis decision was not derived from a careful analysis of Tennessee
law. The chancery court relied upon Mansfield's dissent in support of
its belief that it would be "unreasonable" for them to not protect "the
efforts and energies" of Tennessee artists.'4
The Commerce opinion demanded consideration by the district
court in its ruling in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. , the second
case considered in this article. The case was initially instituted in 1977
when Factors Etc., Inc. and Boxcar Enterprises brought action to pre-
vent Pro Arts, Inc. and Stop and Shop Companies from selling mer-
chandise, such as memorial posters of Elvis Presley. 6 Boxcar alleged
that it had contracted with Presley, prior to his death, for the exclusive
right to merchandise Elvis Presley products. After Presley's death,
Boxcar granted Factors an exclusive license to use Presley's name and
likeness in connection with the manufacture and sale of any kind of
merchandise.
Factors initiated action in federal district court in New York,
where the court held that since a descendible right of publicity existed
under New York law, Factors was entitled to an injunction restraining
Pro Arts from manufacturing, selling, or distributing the Presley pos-
ters and from making any further commercial use of his name or
likeness. "7
The ruling was affirmed by the Second Circuit in a decision now
known as Factors 1.18 The United States Supreme Court denied certio-
rari on defendant Pro Arts' motion. 19 The district court subsequently
entered summary judgment for Factors, issued a permanent injunction
prohibiting Pro Arts from marketing Presley memorabilia, and ordered
that further proceedings be held to determine damages. 20
Pro Arts appealed, arguing that Tennessee law as enunciated by
the Sixth Circuit in Memphis Development,2' should be applied. De-
spite its earlier affirmance of the preliminary injunction, the Second
Circuit now reversed.22 In a ruling now recognized as Factors II, the
court concluded that the case should be resolved on the basis of Ten-
nessee law; since Tennessee law afforded no answer to the question of
14. 7 Med. L. Rptr. at 2208.
15. 541 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
16. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F.Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
17. Id
18. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978).
19. 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
20. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F.Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
21. 616 F.2d 956.
22. 652 F.2d at 281, 283.
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whether the right was descendible, it would defer to the Sixth Circuit's
holding in Memphis Development.23 This time it was Factors which
sought and was denied certiorari in the Supreme Court.
2 4
The case came back to the U.S. District Court in 1982, on Pro
Arts' motion for summary judgment and for an assessment of damages
for wrongful injunction. Factors cross-moved for summary judgment,
and, alternatively, requested the court to stay entry of judgment to per-
mit Factors to petition the Second Circuit for recall of its mandate and
for rehearing. Factors relied on Commerce Union Bank v. Coors 25 , de-
cided in the interim, since it enunciated for the first time a clear state-
ment of Tennessee law on the right of publicity.
The district court noted that Commerce26 was only a state court
decision and as such, not binding on federal court, but held it neverthe-
less entitled to proper regard. Its reasoning was clearly influenced by
the chancery court decision and in fact the court's conclusion stated
that since Factors H27 and Memphis Development28 were decided
before the Tennessee court's decision in Commerce, the court would
stay entry of judgment in order to permit Factors to petition the Second
Circuit to rehear the case in view of the recent intervening state court
decision.
Unfortunately for Factors, another Tennessee Chancery Court de-
cision had been decided prior to their hearing in the Second Circuit.
This interim case, Lancaster v. Factors,29 decided in Shelby County,
involved yet another Presley right of publicity matter, but surprisingly
this chancery court was not influenced by the reasoning of its sister
court.
Relying on Memphis Development,3 ° the court pointed to the
problems in distinguishing between the "commercial" publicity right
enjoyed by the entertainer and the "public" right which the entertainer
relinquishes during his lifetime.3' The Lancaster court found that the
commercial exploitation rights in the name, likeness, and image of
Presley terminated on his death. This second chancery court's conflict-
23. 652 F.2d at 281, 283.
24. 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
25. See 7 Med. L. Reptr. 2204.
26. Id
27. See 652 F.2d 278.
28. See 616 F.2d 956.
29. 9 Med. L. Rptr. 1109 (1982).
30. See 616 F.2d 956.
31. 9 Med. L. Rptr. at 1110.
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ing ruling was all the Second Circuit needed to deny the petition for
rehearing then before it.
In early 1983, the Second Circuit court in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc. 32 held that the two conflicting chancery court decisions made
it unnecessary for a determination of whether Commerce33 warranted
the disregarding of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Memphis Develop-
ment .3 4 The court stated that the Lancaster35 holding was entitled to
no less weight than Commerce. In fact, the Lancaster case may even
have carried more precedential weight, as it involved the same parties
who were plaintiffs in the current litigation. Pursuant to this reasoning,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied the motion to recall the
mandate and the alternative petition for rehearing was also summarily
denied.36
The finality in the current exhaustive line of reasoning which
holds against descendibility (at least in Tennessee) was further substan-
tiated when the Factors case came before the U.S. District Court in
New York to assess damages against Factors.37
In its ruling, the court appeared to apologize for the unfortunate
procedural vacillation of the case, noting the rollercoaster nature of the
line of decisions. Nevertheless, the court followed the most recent path
of reasoning in granting defendants Pro Arts damages for wrongful
injunction.
Admitting that the course of the litigation had certainly been unu-
sual and difficult for both parties, the Court stated that simply because
the Second Circuit had earlier wrongfully granted Factors' motion for
injunction, Pro Arts should not have to suffer for it. The court rea-
soned that they would not decline to award damages to defendants
"simply because plaintiffs acted in good faith or because defendants
failed at the outset to argue that Tennessee law applied in this ac-
tion."38 The court concluded by stating, "The fact remains that it is
the defendants who have prevailed in this suit, and that for several
years, plaintiffs, by virtue of an injunction granted by this court, had
the benefit of an exclusive license to which they were ultimately found
not entitled. ' 39  Pro Arts was awarded damages not to exceed
32. 701 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983).
33. 7 Med. L. Rptr. 2204, 2208.
34. See 616 F.2d 956.
35. 9 Med. L. Rptr. at 1112.
36. 701 F.2d 11-12.
37. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts Inc., 9 Med. L. Rptr. 1642 (1983).
38. Id
39. Id at 1646.
1984]
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
$100,000.40
The Factors line of cases points to the state of confusion that cur-
rently exists concerning the right of publicity as it is litigated in state,
district, and circuit courts throughout the country. There continues to
be conflict jurisdictionally, and there will probably be further argument
given the fact that the right of publicity derives from common law
rights.4 '
The United States Supreme Court has remained reluctant to con-
sider the issue42 and there will certainly be continuing problems in the
area. New York presently seems to be the most generous in its consid-
eration of the right of publicity and its descendibility. In an evaluation
of Laurel and Hardy's rights of publicity, the New York district court
concluded that the right would be descendible even if not exercised
during the performers' lifetime.43 A later decision by the Second Cir-
cuit in New York holding that the Marx Brothers' rights of publicity
did not survive their death, 44 was decided on the basis of California law
(since the Marx Brothers had been California residents on their death,
and all rights being litigated were assigned in California). Since the
New York trial court initially applied New York law and found the
right to be descendible the case therefore served as further enunciation
of New York's stance on the issue of desendibility.
If an attorney, agent or manager was considering the issue of right
of publicity as it pertains to a client, the safest action would seem to be
to have all contracts and assignments executed in the New York juris-
diction. Given the view of California courts, and the line of reasoning
that culminated in the latest Factors decisions, this course would make
the most sense.
Judge Mansfield, in his well-reasoned dissent in Factors,45 sug-
gested that only when courts cease to be afraid to step forward will a
coherent approach to the problem concerning right of publicity be
enunciated. His argument centered around the Second Circuit's reluc-
tance to retackle Factors simply because two chancery court decisions
were in conflict. He reasoned that appellate courts should be allowed
to determine what position a state supreme court would be likely to
40. Id.
41. The right of publicity evolved from the common law right of privacy initially de-
fined in Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
42. See 579 F.2d 215 and 616 F.2d 956.
43. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F.Supp 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
44. Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day and Night Company, Inc., 689 F.2d 317 (2d
Cir. 1982).
45. 701 F.2d at 13.
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take (in light of the most recent developments in the area being consid-
ered), rather than simply deferring to another Circuit's reasoning on
procedural grounds. Mansfield convincingly, points out that the Sixth
Circuit clearly could not argue that there had been clear and authorita-
tive precedents to support their reasoning because at the time of their
decision, there was no precedent.
Upon an examination of the area, this author, guided by instinct
and a sense of fairness, believes that artists should be able to contract
away their publicity rights, and those rights should be inheritable.
Others would argue against this opinion.46
An argument against finding descendibility is based on many fac-
tors including the higher standard of living that entertainers tend to
enjoy during their life. Celebrities reap financial gain only due to the
public's support; therefore after their death, the public should be al-
lowed to partake in any profits that can be derived from commercial
exploitation of that artist's name and likeness. It is argued that unless
this approach is enforced, heirs upon heirs would be able to exercise
these rights in perpetuity, causing potential conflict with the policies
underlying federal preemption (given the limited duration of rights
construed under copyright statutes).
47
However, this author is not certain that given the free enterprise
nature of our society, one should not be allowed to contract as he
wishes. An individual can pass on a family business from generation to
generation without judicial interference. Part of the business of being
an entertainer evolves around publicity, and clearly rights to a person's
likeness are part of that individual's business. Why should random de-
cisions be made concerning such important rights? As mass communi-
cation and the power of the media catapulte more and more
individuals into the rank of stars, a clearly enunciated policy declaring
the extent of the right of publicity becomes paramount.
This author is not persuaded by the argument that since the public
is responsible for making entertainers marketable, the entire society
should be able to benefit from entertainers' marketability after their
death. This reasoning is especially inappropriate in the period immedi-
ately following an artist's death where the immediate family may need
the money from merchandising rights more than ever. Similar consid-
46. For a discussion supporting the public's right to profit commercially from an artist's
likeness after their death, see Hoffman, Limitations On The Right OfPublicity, 28 Bull. Corp.
Soc'y, pg. 11, item 137 (1980).
47. id at 138.
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erations of timing underlie the protection given to heirs of copyright
proprieties.
Nonetheless, an argument can be made that at some point in time,
merchandising rights, like copyrights, should fall in the public domain.
Given the current conflict across the nation, having Congress attempt
to establish a clear body of law concerning this area should be a para-
mount concern. Legislation reasoned along the lines of the current
Copyright Act may be the perfect compromise so that rights may be
retained by the heirs for some designated period. If the legislative body
does not tackle the area, one would hope courts move towards the pro-
tection of descendible rights, especially when those rights are exploited
during one's lifetime.
Justin Pierce
3. Groucho Marx v. Day & Night Co.
The right of publicity is the right to the exclusive use of a celeb-
rity's name and likeness. Whether the right is descendible, and can be
asserted after the death of a celebrity by his heirs and assignees, is an
issue of considerable debate. New York courts have held the right of
publicity to be descendible.' The California Supreme Court has held
that a celebrity's failure to exploit the right of publicity during life, will
bar the descendibility of such rights upon death.2 It remains uncertain
whether California law would support descendibility where a celebrity
had exploited the right, and how broad this protection would be. Due
to this disparity, the determination of which state's law governs the
descendibility issue is critical to the outcome of a case.
In Groucho Marx Productions Inc. v. Day and Night Co., Inc. ,3 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal, exercising diversity jurisdiction, held
that the descendibility of the Marx Brothers' right of publicity was gov-
erned by California law, and not by New York law as the district court
had concluded.4 In interpreting California law, the circuit court held
that the right of publicity either does not survive death or if it does
1. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see also
Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day and Night, Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (1981), reversed on
other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982)(lower court's interpretation of New York law
regarding the right of publicity left untouched by the Second Circuit's reversal on choice-of-
law grounds).
2. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
3. 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
4. Id. at 318-19.
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survive, it only survives to the extent it was exploited during life.'
Thus, because the Marx Brothers had not exploited their rights of pub-
licity in the particular medium under consideration, a musical play, the
heirs and assignees of the Marx Brothers could not recover.
This action arose out of the production of the musical play "A Day
in Hollywood/A Night in the Ukraine", which opened on Broadway in
May, 1980. At issue was the second half of the play which purported to
be the way the Marx Brothers would have staged Anton Chekhov's
novel "The Bear". While the Marx Brothers' names were not used, the
script featured performers simulating the appearance and comedic
mannerisms of Groucho, Chico, and Harpo. Plaintiffs were Groucho
Marx Productions, Inc. (GMP), and Susan Marx, as trustee under the
will of Harpo Marx. Defendants were Day and Night Company, Inc.,
and the producers of the play.
GMP and Susan Marx filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, alleging that Day and Night
had appropriated the Marx Brothers' rights of publicity, rights which
were purported to have descended to their heirs. Damages were sought
in the nature of a license fee. When first considering the case, the dis-
trict court held that New York law, which recognizes a right of publi-
city that is both assignable and descendible, governed the parties'
substantive rights. The district court next explored the subsidiary ques-
tion of whether a celebrity must exploit his rights while alive as a pre-
requisite to descendibility. The court made it clear that, under New
York law, the right of publicity will descend even in the absence of any
exploitation of commercial uses other than the celebrity's primary ac-
tivity for which he is made famous. Finding that the Marx Brothers
sufficiently exploited their rights of publicity through their numerous
and memorable performances, the district court granted plaintiffs' mo-
tion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.
In reversing, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal stated that the
district court's initial decision to apply New York law had been proce-
durally incorrect, and accordingly, found it unnecessary to rule on the
correctness of the lower court's substantive conclusions. The correct
procedure for "a New York court, considering a right of publicity case,
would [be to] apply its property choice-of-law rules to select the state
whose law determines whether a plaintiff has a protectable right of
publicity."6 Applying this principle, the court concluded that the par-
5. Id
6. Id at 319. The court cited its recent decision in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,
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ties' rights should be governed by California law, notwithstanding the
fact that production of the play occurred in New York.7
Interpreting California law regarding the descendibility issue, the
Second Circuit examined two leading California decisions, Guglielmi v.
Spelling- Goldberg Productions,' and Lugosi v. Universal Pictures.' The
court first noted that the California Supreme Court held in Guglielmi
that "the right of publicity protects against the unauthorized use of
one's name, likeness or personality, but that the right is not descendible
and expires upon the death of the person so protected."'" Notwith-
standing the unequivocal nature of this statement, the court decided to
explore the issue further."
Lugosi involved a suit by the widow and son of the late actor Bela
Lugosi against Universal Pictures for allegedly violating the right of
publicity which they had inherited from the deceased actor. Universal
had licensed the use of Lugosi's portrayal of the Dracula character to
advertise other Dracula films in which Lugosi did not appear, and to
promote Dracula products. The California Supreme Court, focusing
on the fact that Lugosi had never exercised his right of publicity by
exploiting his name and likeness in association with the Dracula char-
acter, ruled in favor of Universal.' 2
The Second Circuit noted that "[w]ithout question, Lugosi estab-
lished that California law does not recognize a descendible right of
publicity available to the heirs of a celebrity who did not exploit his
652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, -U.S.-, (1982), leave tofile petition for rehearing
granted, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1982), for this choice-of-law rule in right of publicity cases.
7. 689 F.2d at 320. The court detailed the determinative facts: All three Marx Brothers
were California residents at the time of their deaths; nine months before his death, Groucho
had assigned his right of publicity to plaintiff GMP, a California corporation; while Chico
and Harpo made no inter vivos assignments of their publicity rights, Chico's estate entered
into a contract under the laws of California, allegedly conveying Chico's right of publicity to
GMP; plaintiff Susan Marx is a California resident, asserting Harpo's right of publicity and
acting as trustee of the residuary will, probated in California.
8. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979) (per curiam)(a suit by the
nephew of Rudolph Valentino for damages and injunctive relief resulting from the broad-
cast of a network television program about the life of the legendary actor).
9. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (a suit by the heirs of the late
actor Bela Lugosi, who played the title role in the 1930 film version of Dracula, to recover
profits made by defendant motion picture company in licensing the "Count Dracula"
character).
10. 689 F.2d at 320, citing Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25 Cal. 3d 860,
603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979)(per curiam).
11. 689 F.2d at 320. In spite of the clear statement in Guglielmi, the court decided to
examine the issue further because the Lugosi decision, on which Guglielmi relies, "is at least
open to the interpretation that its holding is narrow. .. "
12. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 818-20, 603 P.2d 425, 428-29, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 326-27.
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own right during his lifetime. What is less certain, however, is whether
the right is descendible when the celebrity does exploit it during his
lifetime."13
The court concluded that Lugosi may be interpreted in two ways.
California recognizes either no descendible right of publicity, or it rec-
ognizes a right limited to the specific "commercial situations"-prod-
ucts or services-promoted by the celebrity during his lifetime. ' 4 In the
instant case, under either interpretation, the Second Circuit concluded
that plaintiffs could not prevail. First, if the right of publicity does not
survive death, then the heirs or assignees clearly cannot assert the rights
of the deceased Marx Brothers. Similarly, even if a limited descendible
right does exist, "the defendants are not using the names or likenesses
of the Marx Brothers in connection with any product or service that the
comedians promoted during their lives. [footnote omitted]"' 5  The
court concluded that "California would not recognize a descendible
right of publicity that protects against an original play using a celeb-
rity's likeness and comedic style. [footnote omitted]" 6
As the Groucho Marx opinion indicates, the law in California re-
garding the right of publicity is still developing. As the Second Circuit
discerned from Lugosi, the California Supreme Court suggested that
the right may be descendible, albeit limited in scope, if exercised dur-
ing a celebrity's lifetime. There are, however, no clear guidelines to
indicate when a person has "exercised" or "exploited" his publicity
rights sufficiently to assure the descendibility of those rights to his heirs.
Although the many prominent right of publicity cases litigated across
the country have raised these pressing questions,' 7 this author awaits
the dropping of the duck.
Alison D. Bernhard*
13. 689 F.2d at 321.
14. Id at 323.
15. Id
16. Id
17. For some interesting cases on the descendibility of the right of publicity generally,
see Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc. Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980);
Factors Etc. Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908
(1979); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979);
Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance and support of Clifford
Werber.
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B. 'Forum" Violates Cher's Right of Publicity
California recognizes an individual's right to prevent the use of
her name or likeness for commercial purposes.' It is equally well set-
tled that such a right is often subject to the user's First Amendment
freedoms.' In Cher v. Forum International, Ltd 3 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to define the
limitations of such Constitutional protections with respect to publish-
ers' activities.
Popular entertainer Cher granted radio personality Fred Robbins
an interview, which he taped. Both parties understood that the inter-
view was to be published in Us magazine. Us, at Cher's request, re-
turned the interview to Robbins and paid him a "kill" fee. Robbins
then sold the interview to defendant publishers of the tabloid Star and
the pocket-sized magazine Forum, respectively. Cher did not claim the
material was false, defamatory or an invasion of her privacy. Her com-
plaint charged breach of contract, unfair competition and misappropri-
ation of name, likeness and her right of publicity.4
The trial court held all defendants liable, including Forum's parent
company Penthouse, International.5 It found that Star made a false
claim that Cher had endorsed the tabloid.6 It held Forum liable for
publishing advertisements using Cher's name and picture, containing
an implied endorsement by Cher "with knowledge that they were false
or in reckless disregard for their truth."7 The liability of Penthouse
stemmed from its participation in this false advertising practice.8 The
Ninth Circuit reversed the judgments against Robbins and Star, but
1. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (West 1982). Section 3344 provides, in pertinent part, that
"[a]ny person who knowingly uses another's name, photograph or likeness, in any manner,
for the purposes of advertising products . . . without such person's prior consent . . . shall
be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof."
Prior to the passage of § 3344, the courts had also recognized an individual's right of public-
ity. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 603 P. 2d 425
(1979). See also Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 160 Cal. Rptr.
352, 603 P.2d 454 (1979).
2. The unlawful appropriation of the right of publicity can be claimed only if the "pro-
prietary interests at issue clearly outweigh the value of free expression in this context." Gug-
lielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25 Cal. 3d at 871.
3. 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982).
4. See id at 636-37.
5. Id. at 637.
6. Id. at 638.
7. Id at 639-40.
8. Id at 640.
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affirmed against Forum and Penthouse. 9
The court considered the judgment against Robbins to be clearly
in error, stressing the trial court's findings that Cher had no contractual
agreement with Robbins, and that Robbins had never promised any
interviewee approval rights. It reasoned that any possible liability of
Robbins would have to come from his participation in one or more of
the publisher defendant's actions, of which there was no showing. "
Cher claimed that Star falsely represented the interview as being
exclusive and wrongfully appropriated her implied endorsement of
Star for commercial purposes. She did not claim that Star published
false statements with actual malice. Her theory was that Star's use of
her picture and the words "exclusive series" on its cover constituted
false representations to the public." The Ninth Circuit read it some-
what differently, holding that Star was entitled to inform its readers
that the issue contained an article about Cher. . . and that the article
had not previously appeared elsewhere."' 2 The court found no evi-
dence to support Cher's contention of an implied endorsement, and
that Star's actions fell far short of satisfying the requirements of actual
malice. 3 It went on to note that section 3344 of the California Civil
Code 14 did not apply, as the facts of the case fell into the exception
created for news accounts in section 3344(d).' 5
Cher brought the same claims against Forum, but the court found
that Forum did engage in knowing falsity in its subscription advertis-
ing." It pointed out that recovery is not available if the publication is
protected by the First Amendment.' 7 The court stated that Forum
could have lawfully used Cher's name and picture in its subscription
advertising, but only for the purpose of promoting the protected publi-
cation or to indicate its contents.' 8 Forum went beyond such an "hon-
est" exploitation of the situation when it claimed that "Cher tells
Forum" things she "would never tell Us".'9 The court found this pa-
9. Id
10. Id. at 637.
11. Id. at 638.
12. Id
13. Id
14. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (West 1982). See supra note 1.
15. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(d) provides that "a use of a name, photograph or likeness in
connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political
campaign, shall not constitute a use for purposes of advertising..
16. 692 F. 2d at 639.
17. Id
18. Id
19. Id
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tently false in that Cher had not "told" Forum anything, and had actu-
ally intended the interview to be published by Us.2" It also found that
Forum falsely stated that Cher endorsed that magazine. Although the
statement "[s]o join Cher and Forum's hundreds of thousands of other
adventurous readers today" could be interpreted variously, deference
was given to the trial court's conclusion that it constituted a knowingly
false implication of Cher's endorsement.2'
Finally, Penthouse was also held liable due to the extent of its par-
ticipation in Forum's tortious acts. Penthouse owns 80% of the stock in
Forum, and Penthouse's staff participated in the preparation of the ad-
vertisements in issue, which appeared in both Penthouse and Forum
magazines.22
With Cher v. Forum, the Ninth Circuit has more clearly defined
the circumstances under which an alleged misappropriation of public-
ity will be protected by the First Amendment. In so doing, it has not
strayed, in letter or spirit, from recent decisions and discussions in this
area.
The California Supreme Court recognized the right of publicity in
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures .23 There, however, Bela Lugosi's name
and likeness were used in the advertisement and promotion of commer-
cial products, obviating the need for First Amendment analysis. Such
products, unlike the various media, are not the sources of ideas and
opinions.24  However, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co. ,25 the United States Supreme Court denied First Amendment pro-
tection to a television broadcaster who videotaped the entire perform-
ance of the plaintiff's cannonball act and aired it on the 1 1 o'clock
news. The Cher court properly distinguished Zacchini as really a pro-
tection of the entertainer's right of performance, rather than merely a
use of his name or likeness. As Justice White put it, the "petitioner
does not merely assert that some general use, such as advertising, was
made of his name or likeness."'26 He then suggested that such a lesser
use would be entitled to greater protection. 27 The Zacchini Court was
concerned with the entertainer's ability to earn a living, and any threats
20. Id
21. Id at 640.
22. Id
23. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal Rptr. 323, 603 P.2d 425 (1979).
24. The products included target games, candy dispensers and beverage stirring rods.
Id at 851 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
25. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
26. Id at 573 n. 10.
27. Id.
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to the economic value of his performance.28 However, Cher had no
such claim. No material work product that could decrease in value
through increased exposure was involved, as only her name and like-
ness were used.
In Guglielmi v. Spelling- Goldberg Productions,29 the California
Supreme Court protected the use of Rudolph Valentino's name and
likeness in a fictionalized film account of his life and the accompanying
advertisements. Although the actual malice standard did not apply to
that fictional work,3° the court broadly stated that "the right of public-
ity has not been held to outweigh the value of free expression."3 Fur-
ther, the use of his name and likeness in advertisements for the film did
not wrongfully appropriate the plaintiffs right of publicity. The court
stressed that it was merely an adjunct to the exhibition of the film, and
did not promote anything but that film. 32 It was when Forum pro-
moted Penthouse magazine as well as Forum itself that it exceeded the
Guglielmi standard, and protection was accordingly denied. That stan-
dard was clear enough, and the respective actions of Star and Forum
stand as instructive examples of what is and is not protected.
The implications of Cher for entertainers should be clear. If you
want any control over the content or distribution of an interview, re-
serve your rights in a written contract with the interviewer. Then, if
you want to sue a publisher for appropriation of your right of publicity
through false representations or implications, be prepared to meet the
burden of showing actual malice. If use of your name or likeness in the
context of advertising does not meet that standard, you must show that
the advertisement is not merely an adjunct of the protected publication
or that it promotes something beyond that publication. But, in the end,
don't forget that this type of publicity is usually favorable, and your
publicist could hardly try to bill you for it at the end of the month.
David Keitel
28. Id Zacchini relied on the claim that respondent had televised the act that he nor-
mally got paid for performing.
29. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 603 P. 2d 454 (1979).
30. Truthful and fictional works have equal Constitutional stature. It is meaningless to
charge that an author of a fictional work knew his work was false. Id at 871.
31. Id. at 872.
32. Id at 872-73.
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